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CASE NO. 14257 
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vs. 
BENEIFICIAL HOMES, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, and 
RON GIBB, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT u 
Mary Buzianis .^  .:*•*• 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the plaintiff-respondent 
to enforce a promissory note. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court without a jury, awarded a judgment to 
plaintiff in the amount of $5,500.00 plus $1,181.35 in interest, 
court costs of $37.80 and attorneys' fees in the sum of $2,227.11 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment 
of the trial court. 
STATEMENTS OF FACTS 
Respondent accepts the statement of facts of appellant 
with the following clarifications and additions: 
Plaintiff, Mary Buzianis, transferred certain real pro-
perty to Beneficial Homes Incorporated for the development of a 
subdivision. In consideration thereof defendant, Ronald Gibb, 
personally executed a promissory note on the 14th day of January, 
1971, agreeing to pay plaintiff the sum of $7,500.00, at the 
rate of $500.00 per lot as each lot was sold from East Highlands 
Subdivision #4. 
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Plaintiff's suit was brought against Beneficial Homes 
Incorporated and Ronald Gibb, personally, alleging that the 
defendants had defaulted in making payments on said written 
instrument according to the tenor thereof, in that defendants 
had transferred said lots from Beneficial Homes Incorporated to 
Lawrence D. Gibb without making the $500.00 per lot payment 
thereon and thereby owed the amount of $5,500.00 on said written 
instrument and further defendants defaulted in making interest 
payments on said written instrument according to the tenor there-
of and owed interest at the rate of six (6) percent per annum 
and reasonable attorneys fees as provided by the promissory 
note.(Exhibit A attached to Complaint). The defendant, Ron 
Gibb, prepared and filed his own answer to plaintiff's Complaint 
on the 13th day of August, 1974. 
At the initial hearing on June 9, 1975, Ron Gibb appear-
ed personally and represented himself.(Tr. 2, June 9, 1975 hear-
ing) . The parties entered a stipulation that judgment be grant-
ed against the defendant, Ron Gibb, and that said judgment was 
not to be entered until July 14, 1975.(Tr. 2&3, June 9, 1975 
hearing). 
The stipulated purpose for the delayed entry of judgment 
was to afford the defendant, Ron Gibb, an opportunity to produce 
evidence that he was entitled to additional credits against the 
amounts prayed for by the plaintiff.(Tr. 2&3, June 9, 1975 hear-
ing) . This stipulation was accepted by the Court and judgment 
was granted, but not allowed to be entered until July 14, 1975. 
(Tr. 3&4, June 9, 1975 hearing). 
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On July 14, 1975, the parties again appeared in Court 
and the defendant, Ron Gibb, presented to the Court a series 
of copies of checks he alleged to have been payments to Mary 
Buzianis on the above described promissory note.(Tr. 2, July 
14, 1975 hearing). These copies were not received by the Court 
as exhibits or evidence, but the plaintiff did admit receipt 
of several of these checks, and the same were only considered 
upon plaintiffs admission of their receipt and proper credit 
having been given therefore. 
Check #1212, in the amount of $2,139.00, was acknowledged 
as a down payment for the purchase of plaintiff's real property 
East Highland Subdivision #4.(Tr. 3, July 14, 1975 hearing). The 
check was dated in numerals and appeared to counsel for plaintiff 
that the date could possibly be September 14, 1971. However, 
the check was stamped paid by the bank upon which it was drawn 
January 15, 1971, and therefore the date of said check was pro-
bably January 14, 1971, the date of the promissory note and 
confirms that said check was received as a down payment on the 
land. There never was a finding by the Court that this check 
was received on September 14, 1971, and the plaintiff never admit-
ted receiving it on that date. 
Copies of four other checks numbered B4985, B4986, B4705 
and B4987 in the amount of $500.00 each and each being designated 
East Highland y/4 were admitted by plaintiff to have been received 
and credited to the above described promissory note.(Tr. 2&3, 
July 14, 1975 hearing). 
The remaining copies of checks entitled East Highland #3 
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were rejected by the plaintiff as evidence of payments on the 
above entitled promissory note for East Highland #4.(Tr. 3, July 
14, 1975 hearing). Of the checks presented by defendant for 
credit plaintiff acknowledged five as having been received, four 
of which were in the amount of $500.00 each and one in the amount 
of $2,139.00 as down payment. The trial court inquired if proper 
credit had been given for these checks that plaintiff acknowledged 
receipt of. Plaintiff answered affirmatively. The court asked 
defendant if there were any questions about that. The defendant 
replied MThe five he went through?" The Court - "Have you been 
given credit for those?11 The defendant - "Yes."(Tr. 3, July 14, 
1975 hearing). 
The Court at the second hearing granted the defendant, 
Ron Gibb, an additional week to procure admissible evidence, and 
Ron Gibb was told to appear on the 21st day of July, 1975, at 
9:00 o'clock.(Tr. 8&9, July 14, 1975 hearing). 
At the third hearing on July 21, 1975, the defendant, 
Ron Gibb, failed to appear and the court allowed entry of the 
previously granted judgment without any further restrictions on 
execution.(Tr. 2, July 21, 1975 hearing). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED DEFENDANT'S EVIDENCE 
OF DAMAGES. 
Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties a judgment was 
granted on June 9, 1975, as prayed for in plaintiff's Complaint. 
(Tr. 2, June 9, 1975 hearing). The parties also stipulated that 
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the judgment would be entered on July 14, 1975, provided that no 
documentation at that time could be presented by the defendant 
showing that defendants were entitled to additional set-offs. 
On July 14, 1975, the defendant, Ron Gibb, appeared in 
Court and presented to the plaintiff copies of ten checks he 
alleged to have been payed to the plaintiff on the promissory 
note.(Tr. 2, July 14, 1975 hearing). The plaintiff acknowledged 
that four of the checks in the amount of $500.00 each and desig-
nated East Highland #4 had been received and credited to the pro-
missory note at issue, for a total credit in the amount of 
$2,000.00.(Tr. 2&3, July 14, 1975 hearing). 
The plaintiff also acknowledged receipt of a check for 
$2,139.00 as the initial down payment on East Highland #4.(Tr. 
3, July 14, 1975 hearing). 
The defendant was specifically asked by the Court if he 
had been given credit for the above five described checks, and 
he responded that he had.(Tr. 3, July 14, 1975 hearing). 
The remaining copies of checks presented by the defendant, 
Ron Gibb, were rejected by the plaintiff as evidence of payments 
on the promissory note for East Highland #4.(Tr. 3, July 14, 1975 
hearing). The plaintiff alleged that these checks were for other 
transactions, such as East Highland #3 and not East Highland #4. 
The Court also refused to accept these copies of checks 
as evidence qualifying for credit, since it found the unauthenti-
cated copies of checks lacking an endorsement on the reverse side 
and in the words of the Court f,There is nothing on the check that 
indicates what it was for at all-nothing at all."(Tr. 5&6, July 14, 
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1975 hearing). The trial Court refused therefore to accept 
and give credit for the remaining checks since they failed to 
show on their face that they were in payment of East Highland 
#4V-
The Court after refusing to accept these copies as 
evidence told the defendant that he had the burden of present-
ing admissable evidence.(Tr. 4, July 14, 1975 hearing). The 
burden of proof was shifted to the defendant at the initial 
hearing when he stipulated to the judgment.(Tr. 3, June 9, 1975 
hearing). The parties at that initial hearing agreed that the 
judgment would not be entered for five weeks allowing the defen-
dant time to present evidence that he was entitled to additional 
credits against the judgment.(Tr. 3, June 9, 1975 hearing). The 
defendant himself agreed that he had the burden of procuring 
evidence f?of any payment, or partial payment on the amounts due 
under the note" to prevent the judgment from being entered. (Tr. 3, 
June 9, 1975 hearing). 
At the second hearing the defendant also attempted to 
introduce a disbursement record for East Highland #3, that was 
prepared by Commercial Security Bank.(Tr. 7&8, July 14, 1975 
hearing). The defendant alleged that Commercial Security Bank 
had recorded payments on this ledger that he had authorized to 
be paid towards East Highland #4.(Tr. 8, July 14, 1975 hearing). 
However, the Court refused to accept this evidence. The Court 
stated that before this kind of evidence would be admissable 
the defendant would have to "subpoena someone from the bank and 
have him testify".(Tr. 8, July 14, 1975 hearing). The defendant 
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then stated he would subpoena someone from the bank, whereupon 
the Court gave the defendant, Ron Gibb until July 21, 1975, at 
9:00 a.m. to bring forth a witness or further admissible evidence. 
(Tr. 9, July 14, 1975 hearing). On July 21, 1975, the defendant 
failed to appear at the scheduled time and the Court allowed the 
previously granted judgment to be entered.(Tr. 2, July 21, 1975 
hearing). 
The plaintiff continually objected to the introduction of 
all checks and ledgers dealing with East Highland #3, since the 
promissory note of defendant was entitled East Highland #4.(Tr. 
3&4, July 14, 1975 hearing). These were the same copies of checks 
and ledgers that were excluded by the court at the trial, and in 
its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court said they 
were Mnot entitled to credit against said note due to incomplete 
documentation". 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT GAVE THE DEFENDANT CREDIT FOR A 
$2,139.00 CHECK WHICH THE PLAINTIFF ADMITTED RECEIV-
ING AS A DOWN PAYMENT. 
At the hearing on July 14, 1975, the plaintiff admitted 
that defendant's copy of a check for $2,139.00 had been received 
by the plaintiff, and that it was the "down payment on the land, 
East Highland #4M.(Tr. 3, July 14, 1975 hearing). 
The defendant was asked if he had been given credit for 
this and four other checks and he responded that he had.(Tr. 3, 
July 14, 1975 hearing). The Court in its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law referred to this check as "'No. 1212, drawn on 
the account of Beneficial Homes Incorporated, in the amount of 
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$2,139.00 [and] was the down payment for purchase of said pro-
perty and previously credited to defendants prior to execution of 
the note11. 
Defendant-appellants in their brief state that check 
No. 1212 for $2,139.00 was dated September 14, 1971, and therefore 
could not have been a down payment on the promissory note executed 
on January 14, 1971. However the trial court never referred to 
the date of the $2,139.00 check and as was previously stated in 
the Court's findings of fact, that the check, Numbered 1212 for 
$2,139.00 was the down payment for purchase of said property and 
was previously credited to defendants prior to execution of the 
note. 
The only reference to the date on check No, 1212 was by 
the plaintiff's attorney, Mr. Watson, when he was attempting to 
read the copy of that check, on Page 3 of the July 14, 1975 
transcript, as follows: 
"Then, your Honor, there is a check there, dated 
looks like September the 14th of 1971, it's in the 
amount of $2,139.00, which is a down payment on the 
land, East Highland #4." 
It is clear from this statement that the date on the 
unauthenticated copy was not clearly legible. It is also clear 
that if the plaintiff had not acknowledged receipt of this 
$2,139.00 check as the down payment on East Highland #4 it would 
never have been entertained by the Court. 
The defendant, Ron Gibb, at the trial never questioned 
the fact that he had been given credit for the $2,139.00 as a 
down payment on East Highland #4 and never questioned the proposi 
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that it was received by the plaintiff prior to the execution of 
the promissory note on January 14, 1971. He in fact admitted 
having received credit for it.(Tr. 3, July 14, 1975 hearing). 
It is plaintiff-respondent?s contention that the illegible 
numerical date of said check unsuredly referred to as September 
14, 1971 was in fact January 14, 1971, the same date the promis-
sory note as issue was executed. However the only findings of 
fact referred to by the Court concerning this check were that 
check No. 1212 was a down payment and previously credited to 
defendants prior to the note's execution. 
It is a very tenuous position to attempt to overturn the 
lower Court's findings based upon an unsure reading of one digit 
of a numerical date of a copy of a check, contrary to all other 
evidence presented to the Court and the defendant having admitted 
in court to having received credit for said check. 
POINT III. 
THE STIPULATION BETWEEN PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL AND DEFEN-
DANT SHOULD BE GIVEN FULL EFFECT. 
The defendant-appellant, Ron Gibb, acted as his own 
attorney at every stage of the lower court proceedings, includ-
ing the filing of his own Answer, setting the trial date and 
appearing at two separate hearings. 
The defendant, Ron Gibb, specifically agreed at the initial 
hearing that a judgment be granted against himself and in the 
amounts prayed for in plaintiff's Complaint. 
In Deseret Savings Bank v. Walker, 78 Utah 241, 2P.2d 
609 (1931) this Court concluded that a stipulation entered at 
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trial in open court between a layman and an attorney was valid 
and effective as against the lay person. This finding was based 
on the fact that the layman there was, "a man of affairs with 
no little experience in business matters11. 
In the present case the defendant, Ron Gibb, was in the 
business of purchasing property and developing it into subdivisions 
This Court's declarations in Deseret Savings Bank v. Walker, supra, 
apply equally as well to the defendant-appellant in the present 
case, when the Court stated: 
"Nothing is made to appear that he was either ignor-
ant or inexperienced or that any advantage was taken 
of him, or that he did not fully comprehend the full 
meaning of his stipulation and the implications nec-
essary arising therefrom. He made no application to 
the trial court for permission to withdraw his stipula-
tion, and before the trial court made no effort to 
repudiate it nor to be relieved from it on the ground 
of misapprehension or mistake. There is no reason why 
the ordinary rules applicable to stipulations of this 
sort should not be applied and given full effect. 
Id., at 251. 
The defendant, Ron Gibb, also added this statement con-
cerning his competency at the second hearing when he said: 
"The reason I am here by myself is that I am 
competent counsel."(Tr. 6, July 14, 1975 hearing). 
The trial court was very generous in giving the defendant-
appellant five weeks to produce evidence of payments made to 
plaintiff as provided by his stipulation. When he failed to do 
so he was again given another additional week to subpoena witnes-
ses or produce admissible evidence. The defendant responded by 
failing to appear at the third scheduled hearing. There is 
nothing whatsoever in the record to indicate that the defendant 
did not understand the implications of his actions and therefore 
-in-
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his stipulation must be given effect. 
POINT IV. 
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS1 FEES OF $2,227.11 WAS PROPER. 
Plaintiff's suit is an action to recover money due under 
a promissory note. The amount due and owing on the note at the 
time the initial Complaint was prepared was $5,653.22, plus 
$1,028.13 interest, or a total of $6,681.35. The note also pro-
vided that the defendant, Ron Gibb, would also pay a reasonable 
attorney's fee upon default if necessary for collection. Plain-
tiff's Complaint alleged that a reasonable attorney's fee was 
$2,227.11 or thirty-three percent of the amount due and owing. 
The stipulation of the parties entered into on June 9, 
1975, was for "the amounts prayed for according to the prayer 
thereof".(Tr. 2, June 9, 1975 hearing). It is true that this 
stipulation itself did not refer to specific amounts, but only 
referred to the prayer in plaintiff's Complaint. In addition 
to not specifically referring to attorney's fees, it did not 
refer to the amount of interest due, the costs of court, or the 
principal amount due and owing. The parties were well aware of 
these specific amounts as prayed for in plaintiff's Complaint, 
and when the Court accepted the stipulation of the parties it 
accepted a stipulation as to the amount of reasonable attorney's 
fees. It is clear that a stipulation as to attorney's fees is 
sufficient to base a judgment thereon. In F.M.A. Financial 
Corporation v. Build, Inc. 17 Utah 2d 80, 404P.2d 670 (1965) 
this Court stated the rule regarding the awarding of attorney's 
fees, as follows: 
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"It is fundamental that the judgment must be based 
upon findings of fact, which in turn has been followed 
. by this Court and other jurisdictions in regard to 
awarding attorney's fees. Because both judges and 
lawyers have special knowledge as to the value of legal 
services, this is not always required to be proven by 
sworn testimony. It is sometimes submitted upon stip-
ulation : as to amount; or that the judge may rlx"~it on 
the basis of his own knowledge and experience; and/or 
in connection with reference to a Bar approved schedule.M 
The present judgment for attorney1s fees was upon stipula-
tion of the parties, reviewed by the Court and never thereafter 
questioned by the defendant-appellant. It represented plaintiff's 
preparation for three separate hearings and cannot be declared 
clearly unreasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly excluded defendant's proferred 
copies of unendorsed checks, when there was no evidence adduceable 
on their faces to show that they were in payment of the promis-
sory note for East Highland #4. The Court also properly excluded 
a ledger book prepared by Commercial Security Bank when the 
defendant attempted to introduce it without supporting testimony 
from a bank employee. Defendant} Ron Gibb, was given credit 
for $2,139.00 as a down payment received by plaintiff prior to 
the execution of the promissory note and in fact agreed he had 
been properly credited. 
The defendant was a competent businessman self-declared 
competent counsel and therefore there is no reason that his stip-
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ulation for judgment including attorney's fees should not be 
given its full effect. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of March, 1976. 
EDWARD A. WATSON 
Tooele County Courthouse 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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